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ECONOMICS OF GENOCIDE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
By combining the Greek genos (a people, tribe, race) and the Latin cide (to kill), Raphael 
Lemkin (1944, p. 79) invented the word genocide. Article 2 of the 1948 United Nations (UN) 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide defines genocide as 
“any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious 
bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group 
conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) 
Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children 
of the group to another group” (United Nations 2014d). Concepts distinct from but often 
associated with genocide are mass killing, crimes against humanity, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, 
and intentional violence against civilians. Such crimes are often characterized under the broad 
heading of mass atrocities. 
DATA, DEFINITIONS, AND INSTITUTIONS 
Data 
In a summary of large-sample datasets on atrocities involving civilians (civilian atrocity 
datasets), Anderton (in Anderton and Brauer, forthcoming; henceforth “in A/B forthcoming”) 
identifies 202 distinct cases of state-sponsored genocides and mass atrocities (GMAs) from 
1900-2013, 42 state-perpetrated genocides from 1955-2013, and 35 GMAs perpetrated by non-
state groups from 1989-2013. Some well-known genocides include the Armenian genocide 
(1915-1918; estimated fatalities ~1.5 million), the Holocaust (1933-1945; ~10 million), 
Cambodia (1975-1979; ~1.9 million), Rwanda (1994; ~0.8 million), and Sudan-Darfur (2003-
2011; ~0.4 million). A cautious estimate of intentional civilian fatalities associated with the 202 
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state-perpetrated GMAs since 1900 is 84 million. Less well-known are non-state perpetrated 
atrocities such as conducted by the so-called Islamic State, with estimated fatalities of 8,198 
from 2005-2013 (Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2014). 
Definitions 
As defined in the UN Convention, genocide is the intentional destruction, in whole or in part, of 
a specific group of people. In non-genocidal mass killing, perpetrators do not seek to destroy a 
group as such (Waller 2007, p. 14). Crimes against humanity encompass widespread or 
systematic attacks against civilians involving inhumane means such as extermination, forcible 
population transfer, torture, rape, and disappearances. War crimes are grave breaches of the 
Geneva Conventions including willful killing, torture, willfully causing great suffering or serious 
injury, and extensive destruction and appropriation of property. Ethnic cleansing is the removal 
of people of a particular group from a state or region using means such as forced migration or 
mass killing (Pergorier 2013). Violence against civilians (VAC) can incorporate mass atrocities 
but it also includes incidents that are relatively small, specifically, less than 1,000 per case or per 
year. Along with genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing are both 
legal and scholarly terms. 
Schabas (2010, pp. 126-127) emphasizes that at the Nuremberg trials of 1945-46, the 
International Military Tribunal found none of the accused guilty of crimes committed prior to the 
outbreak of war on 1 September 1939; litigation was limited to atrocities during wartime. 
Lemkin’s (1944) and the UN’s conceptions of genocide were novel precisely because they spoke 
to criminal acts committed in wartime or in peacetime (Schabas, 2010). Nevertheless, the UN 
definition of genocide has been subject to critical scrutiny by scholars, for instance in regard to 
groups left out (e.g., political), how to identify “intent,” the inability of the Convention to 
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prevent genocide, the relationship of genocide to other atrocities, and misuse of the term.
1
 The 
UN definition of genocide has not expanded since 1948 to include other groups, but international 
criminal law has evolved. Schabas (2010, p. 141) maintains that the expanded concept of crimes 
against humanity has “emerged as the best legal tool to address atrocities” and “genocide as a 
legal concept remains essentially reserved for the clearest cases of physical destruction of 
national, ethnic, racial, or religious groups.”  
International and domestic institutions 
The twentieth and twenty-first centuries display the emergence and growth of international and 
domestic laws designed to prevent, punish, and/or foster restitution for atrocity crimes. Table 1 
shows a selection of such institutions as well as sources that provide further information. 
Adjudication of mass atrocity crimes began in earnest following World War I with the 
establishment of the Turkish Military Tribunal (TMT) (1919-20), which prosecuted organizers of 
the Armenian genocide (Meierhenrich 2014, p. 316). Dadrian (1997, p. 30) characterized the 
trials as “a milestone in Turkish legal history.” The trials revealed the systematic planning 
behind the genocide, enrichment of perpetrators through looting of victims’ assets, and the lack 
of military necessity for the forced relocation of Armenians. However, the TMT convicted only 
15 men among the hundreds who orchestrated the genocide (Dadrian 1997). 
Following World War II, the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg was 
established in which leading officials were tried for war crimes and crimes against humanity 
(1945-46). Twelve Nazi leaders received the death sentence and many others were given long 
jail terms. The trials had an important influence on the growth of international criminal law 
including the 1948 Genocide Convention, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Shaw (2007), Curthoys and Docker (2008), Moses (2010), Schabas (2010), and Waller (2007).  
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Yugoslavia (ICTY) established in 1993, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 
established in 1994, and the International Criminal Court (ICC) ratified in 2002. As of August 
2014, the ICTY had indicted 161 people for atrocity crimes associated with the wars in the 
former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. As of September 2014, the ICTR had indicted 95 people for 
atrocity crimes associated with the 1994 civil war and genocide and it established the legal 
precedent that mass rape during wartime is genocidal. Following the huge backlog of cases 
awaiting trial in Rwanda, the government turned to the Gacaca court system, based on traditional 
law developed within communities (Bornkamm 2012, Clark 2010). As of October 2014, the ICC 
has indicted 36 individuals for atrocity crimes including three current or former heads of state: 
Omar al-Bashir (Sudan), Uhuru Kenyatta (Kenya), and Laurent Gbagbo (Côte d’Ivoire). 
According to its Statutes, the ICC has jurisdiction with respect to genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes. 
Another important international genocide development occurred at the 2005 UN World 
Summit, in which a norm was adopted by states known as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). 
R2P was part of the impetus for UN Security Council Resolution 1973 passed on 17 March 
2011, which authorized member states to take actions, including enforcement of a no-fly zone, to 
protect civilians from attacks by the Libyan military. Nevertheless, the UN’s R2P resolution, 
passed unanimously in 2005, has no legal force (UN Doc. A/RES/60/1, paras 138, 139).  
Following the Nuremberg trials and the UN Convention, several dozen nations have 
developed domestic laws to put on trial suspected Nazi war criminals and/or perpetrators of more 
recent atrocities (Schabas 2003, Prevent Genocide International 2003). For example, in 2000 the 
Chilean Court of Appeals lifted former President Augusto Pinochet’s immunity from 
prosecution, paving the way for trial for his role in civilian atrocities that occurred during his 
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leadership (Pinochet died prior to any conviction). The case is notable not only because it 
involved a state’s prosecution of its former leader, but also because Pinochet’s initial arrest 
occurred in London based on an application of “universal jurisdiction” by European judges. 
Universal jurisdiction is a principle by which a state (or states, in the Pinochet case) asserts its 
right to prosecute a person for an alleged crime regardless of the crime’s location and the 
accused’s residence or nationality (Lunga 1992). 
Not shown in Table 1 are formalized norms within for-profit and non-profit organizations 
designed to inhibit complicity in atrocities. The ICC followed the ICTY and ICTR in having 
jurisdiction only over “natural persons” and not “legal persons” (Cernic 2010, p. 141), which 
ruled out prosecution of corporations complicit in genocide (individual agents within 
corporations can be tried). Multinational corporations have been complicit in genocide in many 
cases, but have not usually faced prosecution (Kelly 2012). Nevertheless, there have been legal 
efforts, including use of the US Alien Tort Claims Act, to bring litigation against corporations 
for alleged complicity in atrocities and other human rights abuses. Such litigation is leading 
companies to develop norms to avoid such complicity (Paul 2001, Gilbert 2012, Walczak 2010, 
Wettstein 2010, Michalowski 2013).  
[PLACE TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ASPECTS  
If genocide risk is thought of as a variable, r, then this section asks: What are (some of) the risk 
factors that economic theory and associated empirical work point to, i.e., what makes the risk 
nonzero (r > 0)? The section thereafter asks: How can genocide risk be reduced below 1 (r < 1)? 
Theoretical perspectives 
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Formal economic models of genocide are relatively new in the literature on conflict, peace, and 
security between and within states. Verwimp (2003), Ferrero (2013), Anderton (2014b), 
Anderton and Carter (2014), and Anderton and Brauer (in A/B forthcoming) present nonstrategic 
constrained optimization models to highlight conditions under which a political authority would 
choose genocide as part of its goal of controlling territory or government (or both). The models 
reveal conditions in which genocide has a low opportunity cost for the authority, specifically, 
when genocide enhances the authority’s control in the context of crisis or war, is not too 
disruptive to economic activities (e.g., trade), is conducive to looting victims’ wealth, and is not 
likely to generate third-party intervention. Under such conditions, genocide is “cheap,” and a 
positive amount demanded can exist. Genocide prevention requires that the opportunity cost of 
genocide is made high through sanctions, credible threats of third-party intervention to help 
victims and/or oppose authorities, threats of prosecution, and surveillance of atrocities which can 
lead to “naming and shaming” of perpetrators. In addition to modeling genocide risk factors, 
Anderton and Brauer (in A/B forthcoming) use a Lancaster household production model to study 
the “optimal” choice of genocidal techniques (e.g., mass killing, starvation, forced relocation, 
etc.) by a regime that has already chosen genocide. Among the results is a “bleakness theorem” 
in which “piecemeal protection policies along just one or a few dimensions will have relatively 
little overall effect, and sometimes no effect, in protecting the out-group.” 
Game theory models of genocide consider strategic interactions between warring groups 
and/or between an oppressive in-group and an out-group (or victim group) in which intentional 
destruction of civilian groups is part of war tactics or strategy. For example, Azam (2002) and 
Azam and Hoeffler (2002) identify conditions in which warring sides use violence against 
civilians to strengthen themselves in their strategic interaction. Focusing on the years preceding 
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the 1994 Rwandan genocide, Verwimp (2004) develops a four-player game to model the 
strategic interactions among the regime, the domestic opposition, a violent rebel group, and the 
international community. Within the game, eliminating the moderate Hutu opposition and 
exterminating the Tutsi can be “optimal” strategies. Anderton (2010) draws upon the bargaining 
theory of war to show how severe threat against an authority group or an incentive to eliminate a 
persistent rival can lead to genocide as an “optimal” choice. Anderton (2010) and Gangopadhyay 
(in A/B forthcoming) use evolutionary game theory to model how genocide can become socially 
contagious (acceptable) among “ordinary people.” Vargas’ (in A/B forthcoming) model of 
contestation between a government and a rebel group reveals the incentives of each to side to kill 
the civilians who are supporting the enemy. Within the model, Vargas finds that the 
strengthening of either side can have ambiguous effects on the total number of civilians killed, 
thus showing that third-party support for one side or the other can potentially increase civilian 
killing. Esteban, Morelli, and Rohner’s (forthcoming and in A/B forthcoming) inter-temporal 
models of contestation between a government and a rebel group reveal several important and 
sometimes counterintuitive results. In particular they find that new discoveries of resources, 
democratization of the polity, and third-party intervention to defend vulnerable civilians can 
enhance incentives for mass killing if they materialize under the “wrong” conditions.  
The lessons of constrained rational choice and game theory models for thinking about the 
emergence of laws designed to punish and (one hopes) prevent genocide are critical. Laws that 
come into being will be evaluated by potential perpetrators of genocide as part of the constraint 
set being faced. Such agents, if determined to carry out genocide, have an extensive menu of 
inputs for working around such laws to achieve objectives. Laws to punish or prevent genocide 
must consider the multiple options available to potential perpetrators and the potential for laws to 
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lead to unintended consequences. This concern is especially significant in the context of strategic 
interplay between a government, rebel organization, and possible third-party intervener. 
Genocide punishment and prevention law, if not carefully designed, can serve to increase 
incentives for genocide as the Vargas and Esteban, Morelli, and Rohner analyses show.  (On the 
design of law, see the next section.) 
In addition to constrained optimization and game theory models, perspectives from 
behavioral economics may work their way into the study of genocide to a much greater degree 
than has occurred to date. Especially important is the reference-dependent objective function of 
one or a few leaders who have become accustomed to control of political, economic, and/or 
territorial goods. Experiments in behavioral economics often find evidence of loss aversion, in 
which, relative to a reference point such as current hold on power, subjects believe they are 
worse off from a loss than a similar gain leads them to feel better off. The notion of loss of 
power as a form of extreme crisis or existential threat in the minds of leaders is palpable in many 
genocide case studies (Valentino 2004, Totten and Parsons 2013). Such losses, coupled with the 
behavioral phenomenon of loss aversion, suggest that leaders could make extreme choices 
including repressive violence or genocide to avoid loss (Midlarksy 2005, pp. 64-74).
2
 
Empirical perspectives 
There are about 30 published large-sample cross country empirical studies of genocide or other 
forms of VAC risk or seriousness (see Anderton 2014a, Anderton and Carter 2014, and Hoeffler 
in A/B forthcoming). Most of these studies focus on genocide risk or severity from the 
                                                 
2 Midlarsky (2005, chs. 5, 7, 18) introduces loss aversion into a theoretical framework of genocide. Anderton and 
Brauer (in A/B forthcoming) introduce a reference-dependent utility function into a constrained optimization model 
of genocide. Slovic, Västfjäll, and Gregory (in A/B forthcoming) analyze “psychic numbing” in which the perceived 
importance that people attach to saving lives diminishes as the number of lives at risk increases. Anderton (2014a) 
identifies other behavioral economics phenomena that are likely relevant to understanding mass atrocity and its 
prevention. 
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perspective of countries, and thus they focus on the problem of genocide from the “macro” or 
top-down perspective. Another branch of empirical genocide literature focuses on particular 
countries, regions, or locales in which genocide took hold and spread, thus emphasizing a 
“micro” or bottom-up perspective. While almost all of the empirical studies of genocide in the 
literature focus on risk or seriousness based on historical data, studies are emerging with an 
emphasis on forecasting (e.g., Rost 2013, Goldsmith and Butcher in A/B forthcoming). 
The most prominent macro empirical study of genocide risk in the literature is by Harff 
(2003), who focused on a sample of states that experienced “state failure” (e.g., civil war, regime 
collapse) from 1955 to 1997. Of 126 state failures in the sample, 35 led to genocide. Conditioned 
on state failure, Harff used logit analysis to identify six significant risk factors for genocide 
onset: magnitude of political upheaval; history of prior genocide; exclusionary ideology held by 
the ruling elite; autocratic regime; ethnic minority elite; and low trade openness. Failing to make 
the list of significant risk factors was economic development, which Harff proxied by infant 
mortality. Another important macro empirical study of mass atrocity risk is Easterly, Gatti, and 
Kurlat (2006), who assemble a dataset for many countries for the period 1820-1998. Among their 
key results, they find that mass atrocity is significantly less likely at high levels of democracy 
and economic development, in which the latter was proxied by real income per capita.  
Regarding potential economic risk factors for genocide, subsequent empirical research 
suggests that Harff’s result for trade is not robust with most studies reporting no significant 
impact of trade on atrocity risk. In addition, Harff’s result on economic development is open to 
question because an inverse relationship between real income per capita and atrocity risk or 
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seriousness is one of the few modest empirical regularities in the literature.
3
 Other economic risk 
factors considered in the empirical literature are income inequality and resource dependence, in 
which no empirical regularities have yet emerged, and economic discrimination, which is only 
beginning to be considered but in which two studies report a significant positive effect on 
genocide risk (Rost 2013, Anderton and Carter 2014). In the small but emerging empirical 
forecasting literature on genocide, no clear results have yet emerged on the roles of economic 
variables. In their survey of such literature, Butcher and Goldsmith (in A/B forthcoming) suggest 
that “while economic factors might have an underlying causal effect on the likelihood of 
genocidal violence in a society, as predictors in forecasting models they might be overshadowed 
by political or demographic factors that are more proximate to genocide onset.”  
In addition to large-sample “macro” empirical studies of genocide risk or severity are 
country-specific “micro” empirical studies that focus on particular characteristics of a nation, 
region, or individuals that led to the onset or spread of atrocity (see Ibañez and Moya in A/B 
forthcoming and Justino in A/B forthcoming, for literature surveys). Country-specific studies 
typically identify historical, social, and economic conditions particular to the country and tactical 
and strategic aspects of war that are critical for understanding atrocity. Such finer-grained 
elements can be glossed over in large-sample cross section studies. For example, Ibañez and 
Moya’s (in A/B forthcoming) study of Colombia reveals many dynamic, nuanced, and 
interrelated aspects of community and household incentives for civilians to flee violence, why 
some do not flee, and why contesting military forces (government, militias, rebels) tactically and 
strategically kill and/or force relocation of civilians. Such complexities are obviously critical in 
                                                 
3 Theoretical interpretations of low per capita income and elevated genocide risk include the notions that low per 
capita income signifies a “weak state” and low per capita income implies a low opportunity cost of genocide for 
architects and perpetrators (Anderton and Carter 2014).  
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considering laws to reduce risks of future civilian atrocities, but also in prosecuting perpetrators 
and designing reparations in post-genocide settings.  
ECONOMICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Despite some cases of GMA having been brought to trial in national and international courts or 
tribunals – the Armenian trials in Turkey, the Nuremburg trials, the Pinochet case, and more 
recent tribunals regarding Cambodia, Rwanda, and the Balkan wars of the 1990s – the overall 
record of reducing the risk of GMA to below certainty (r < 1) is only mildly encouraging. There 
are several reasons for this. First, even assuming away issues of ignorance and apathy, as a 
matter of economics, unilateral action runs into the problem of sufficient scale and multilateral, 
collective action into issues related to strategic behavior, free-riding, coordination, agency, 
benefit appropriation, and cost shifting. But even assuming that none of these pose a problem, all 
options rely on the existence of well-codified and well-functioning regimes of national and 
international law and their enforcement. Second, as a matter of law, then, (a) state sovereigns 
generally do not cede jurisdiction over nonstate GMA actors to international bodies (e.g., Nigeria 
maintains jurisdictional prerogative over Boko Haram; and if a nonstate actor prevails in an 
internal conflict it may not be brought to justice at all) and (b) state sovereigns are cautious to 
accede to any international treaty that may expose them to undue legal liability. And third, as a 
matter of institutional design, these topics bring up questions, to echo Oliver Williamson (1999), 
as to what kind of bad GMAs are in the first place and, correspondingly, what kind of good 
GMA-related laws are, and how to best supply them. 
 On the demand (or usage) side, are GMA and GMA-related law private (excludable and 
rivalrous), public (nonexcludable, nonrivalrous), club (excludable, nonrivalrous), or common-
resource pool (nonexcludable, rivalrous) bads or goods, or some changing mixture thereof? And 
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on the supply side, are they best provided by private or public actors, or some changing 
combination of the two, and what is the technology of their production (e.g., best-shot, weakest-
link, aggregate effort, or variants thereof)? What sort of issues in agency, transaction costs, and 
institutional design arise? While a considerable global public goods (GPG) literature has sprung 
up in economics (see, e.g., the volumes co-edited by Inge Kaul 1999, 2003, 2006 and literature 
cited therein), application to the design of international law as an instance of GPGs is thin in 
general and almost entirely absent in regard to law and GMA (see, e.g., a recent symposium of 
papers in the European Journal of International Law, 23(3), 2012). 
 As regards GMAs, we suggest that indiscriminate bombing may be conceptualized as a 
public bad for the affected population if it is neither feasible to exclude oneself from the 
bombing nor feasible to seek effective shelter (there can be no rivalry for shelter if there is none 
to be had). Those who do manage to crowd into a bomb shelter, however, partake in the benefit it 
offers, the shelter being a common-resource pool good (nonexclusionary but rivalrous). In 
contrast to indiscriminate bombing, genocide would be a club bad precisely because its architects 
differentiate and select victims. Finally, examples of a private bad suffered in violent conflict 
include un-orchestrated rape in war (rather than orchestrated mass rape) or the death of a soldier 
in the performance of his or her duties (one might say the “expected” bad in war, but not a war 
crime). Similarly, in regard to the good that GMA-related law may provide, international law of 
war is intended as a GPG in that all soldiers share in the benefits the law provides and none of 
them are excluded. In contrast, national law is private to the state whose legislative body passes 
it: It excludes nationals of other states and reserves benefits to its own nationals. But all 
international law is effectively a club good, benefitting those who accede, and becomes a pure 
GPG if and only if all states become Party to the treaty in question. In practice, however, it is 
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conceivable that benefits can be withheld so that the benefits law offers become rival to those 
with the means to access its provisions when needed. Thus, while the Genocide Convention is 
(not quite)
4
 a global public good in principle, the evident practice of “too little, too late” suggests 
that its enforcement is rivalrous and therefore constitutes a common-resource pool good. 
 Even this cursory “walk around goods space” (Brauer 1999, Brauer and van Tuyll 2008, 
ch. 8) suggests that neither GMAs nor GMA-related law have been well-theorized and that the 
good (or bad) in question can take various forms and that each may change across geographic 
space and time. Neither the goods nor the bads are necessarily unitary (of a single form), and to 
conceive of GMA simply as a global public bad requiring a global public good response may be 
inadequate. Moreover, as Shaffer (2012) points out, international laws can be rivalrous to each 
other and their construction is designed, in part, to trade off against multiple national laws (legal 
pluralism).  
In addition, economically efficient (no under- or overprovision) GMA-law in response to 
GMAs may depend on the summation technology of GMA production. Applying Hirshleifer’s 
(1983) insight, that some GPGs are best provided as best-shot products (the single-best effort 
suffices; no need for anyone else to contribute to its provision), weakest-link products (the 
weakest provider limits the good’s effectiveness), or aggregate effort products (the more is 
provided by all, the better for all), Shaffer (2010; esp. Table 2, p. 690), argues that best-shot 
GPGs are best dealt with in global administrative law, weakest-link GPGs by fostering legal 
pluralism, and that only aggregate effort GPGs may require a global constitutionalist approach. 
To illustrate, when a single country has effectively become the world’s only superpower to 
intervene in other states’ (GMA or GMA-alleged) affairs, it may be tempted to overreach or 
                                                 
4 As of mid-2014, some 50 countries—including Indonesia, Japan, Kenya, and Thailand, for example—have not 
ratified the UN Genocide Convention. 
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under-reach according to its own cost-benefit calculated perception of its Responsibility to 
Protect, regardless of the wishes of all other UN members. But superpower intervention (or 
nonintervention) solely at its own discretion challenges global legitimacy (and the US in 
particular is often accused in this regard; France, in regional interventions, less often so). Such 
situations, Shaffer (2010) argues, are best dealt with by global administrative law which might 
hold the “incumbent” of the superpower “office” responsible for its actions. We imagine (since 
Shaffer does not address GMA), that instead of a Genocide Convention, there might exist an 
UN-approved automatic trigger obligating the superpower to intervene in cases of GMA, subject 
to global administrative law. Again, as of this writing, little has been theoretized in this regard. 
 An additional issue pertains to transgenerational global public goods (Sandler, 1997, p. 
68). Again, this is insufficiently theorized but probably of great importance in cases of GMAs 
since each event carries significant generational implications (for a review see, e.g., Ibañez and 
Moya in A/B forthcoming). For public goods provision, Sandler (1999) speaks for four levels of 
awareness rules: First, the myopic view considers making a marginal cost (MC) contribution to 
the provision of a GPG only up to the sum of the marginal benefits (MB) a state estimates for its 
own current generation, MC = ΣMB. Second, although still selfish, a forward-looking view is to 
include one’s own offspring generations, i, such that MC = ΣMBi. Since the expected benefits 
are larger, this translates into greater willingness to make a larger MC contribution. Third, a 
more generous view of the benefits summation includes other states’ populations, j, but only for 
the current generation (MC = ΣMBj). The most enlightened view of all – we call this the 
“Buddha rule” – sums the expected benefits across all generations across all populations, MC = 
ΣMBij. Since such benefit is likely to be large, it justifies correspondingly large outlays. 
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 Finally, design criteria for GPG that would take account of goods (or bads)-space, 
summation technologies, transboundary, and transgenerational aspects have been discussed in 
the literature (Sandler 1997, Brauer 2006, and literature cited therein) but rarely in regard to 
GMA-related national and international law (Myerson, in A/B forthcoming, is an exception). It 
would appear that a fruitful field of inquiry is ready for exploration in this regard. 
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